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FALLING FERTILITY RATES: THE OFFSPRING OF THE
CONTRACEPTIVE MENTALITY
EDWARD L. METZGER III*
From a demographic standpoint, the middle class is in imminent
danger of decline. Since the 1970s, American fertility rates have been at
or below replacement levels, which will eventually result in a declining
population.1 Although some may believe that decreasing the human pop-
ulation is desirable, the economic consequences of such a scenario could
be disastrous. A faltering economy,2 the collapse of the Social Security
System, 3 and a weaker military are just a handful of examples of the
potential repercussions of falling fertility rates and population decline.
4
However, these oncoming crises, the effects of which should be felt
within the next few decades, can still be averted. If the government pro-
motes pronatalist policies through a revision of the tax code, and society
rededicates itself to principles of the natural law, the oncoming threats
induced by falling fertility rates could be avoided.
Part II of this Note examines the effects of falling fertility rates and
highlights a few of the possible consequences of the expected population
decline. Part III introduces the relevant demographical issues, and
explains how our population can temporarily grow despite decades of
falling fertility rates. Part IV examines why fertility rates fall, and Part V
analyzes the judicially-sanctioned activities that contribute to fewer child-
births. Part VI then considers options for boosting fertility rates in the
United States. One possibility is a pronatalist revision of the tax code that
would provide child-raising incentives for middle-class couples, many of
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IN FREE COUNTRIES DON'T HAVE ENOUGH BABIES? 55 (2d ed. 1989) [hereinafter
BIRTH DEARTH].
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426 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 24
whom now opt to amass wealth rather than raise large families. An alter-
native, though possibly concurrent solution, is an adherence to the
precepts of the natural law as expounded by the Catholic Church in her
papal encyclicals, Humanae Vitae and Evangelium Vitae, both of which
promote childbirth. The Note then concludes with a call to action so
that the United States might avert the coming dangers of population
decline.
II. THE EFFECTS OF FALLING FERTILITY
AND POPULATION DECLINE
Commentators such as Paul Ehrlich have long harped on the
hazards of population growth,5 but falling fertility rates and the subse-
quent danger of population decline pose equally disturbing dilemmas.
Collapsing pensions, 6 an insolvent Social Security System,7 less money to
spend on the military,8 a declining economy, 9 less innovation and high-
risk investment,1" and a self-perpetuating cycle of fewer and fewer chil-
dren1' are just a few examples of the unsavory ramifications of popula-
tion decline. These consequences are likely to have a significant impact
"in the next decade, as millions of [B]aby [B]oomers start crashing past
the boundaries of old age, and as today's teenagers find themselves sad-
dled with massive student loans, rising taxes, and growing frustration
over the increasing difficulty of forming or affording a family."12
One important repercussion of falling fertility rates is the negative
effect that it would have on our capitalist system. Historically capitalism
has relied on population growth to promote economic advancement,
13
because population growth is typically accompanied by an increased
demand for goods and services.14 Population decline, on the other hand,
5. See generally PAUL R. EHRLICH, THE POPULATION BOMB (1968) (discussing
some of the potential dangers of population growth, such as famines, increases in crime,
war, and violence, and widespread disease); Paul R. Ehrlich & Anne H. Ehrlich, Sympo-
sium on Population Law: The Population Explosion: Why We Should Care and What We
Should Do About It, 27 ENvTL. L. 1187 (1997).
6. PHILIP LONGMAN, THE EMPTY CRADLE: How FALLING BIRTHRATES
THREATEN WORLD PROSPERITY AND WHAT To Do ABOUT IT 165 (2004).
7. BIRTH DEARTH, supra note 2, at 68.
8. Some commentators have suggested that a decrease in military spending-and
military might-could lead to a decline in U.S. global influence. Peterson, supra note 4,
at 50; LONGMAN, supra note 6, at 20.
9. BIRTH DEARTH, supra note 2, at 55.
10. LONGMAN, supra note 6, at 126-127.
11. Id. at 22.
12. Id. at 149; see also Rod N. Andreason, Note, The International Convention on
Population Development: The Fallacies and Hazards of Population "Control", 1999 BYU L.
Rzv. 769, 789 ("In a time where people are prospering more than at any other time in
history, many are saying that they do not have enough money to have children.").
13. LONGMAN, supra note 6, at 4.
14. BIRTH DEARTH, supra note 2, at 51.
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should lead to a decrease in demand because there will be fewer buyers
for those goods and services. 15 If our population declines, our gross
domestic product (GDP) could shrink,' 6 because one of the main driving
forces behind GDP growth is growth in the labor force. 17 Having fewer
workers can lead to a lower GDP, which is not a traditional hallmark of a
booming economy.1 8
Additionally, falling fertility rates lead to an aging society.' 9 In this
regard, the greatest impact will be felt in Social Security pension plans.
The basic way our Social Security system works is that current workers
put in money for current retirees. No worker puts in money for his own
future use. The system is premised upon having more workers than retir-
ees.2" If our fertility rates continue to stay at or below current levels,
sooner or later there will not be enough workers to pay for the Social
Security benefits of all the retirees. 2 As a result, the Social Security Trust
Fund will become insolvent.22 In a 2008 report, the Board of Trustees of
the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and Federal Disability Trust
Funds (the Social Security funds) predicted that the cost of Social Secur-
ity payments will begin to exceed income by 2017, and that payments at
current levels will no longer be feasible by 2041.23 This problem is no
mere hypothetical; absent reform, it will manifest itself in the very near
future.
In all likelihood, the government would not allow an insolvency
scenario to occur, but what reforms could be undertaken to stop it? Ben-
efits could be cut, but this would raise the ire of the elderly. Taxes could
be raised, but this would anger workers. Retirement age could be
15. Id. at 56.
16. Peterson, supra note 4, at 49 ("If workforces shrink rapidly, GDP may drop
... since labor productivity may not rise fast enough to compensate for the loss of
workers.").
17. LONGMAN, supra note 6, at 41.
18. Id.
19. Peterson, supra note 4, at 42-53; BIRTH DEARTH, supra note 2, at 65.
20. BIRTH DEARTH, supra note 2, at 67.
21. One commentator has described the problem in this way: "More people are
having fewer children, and retirees are now living longer .... There will be less [sic]
workers to support more retirees, and ... these retirees, under the current benefit struc-
ture, will receive payments from the government for a much longer time than originally
anticipated." James E. Hennessey, Note, Keeping the Promise: Will the Bush Administra-
tion "s Plan to Privatize the Social Security System Actually Work?, 11 CONN. INS. L.J. 433,
466 (2005).
22. TRUSTEES REPORT, supra note 3, at 3. The Trustees estimate that the Old-Age
and Survivors Insurance trust funds will be depleted by 2042. Id. See also George W.
Bush, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, 44
WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 117 (Jan. 28, 2008) ("Every member in this Chamber
knows that spending on entitlement programs like Social Security, Medicare, and Medi-
caid is growing faster than we can afford.").
23. TRUsTEE REPORT, supra note 3, at 3.
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delayed, but this would irritate nearly everyone. If retirement age is
delayed, or if Social Security benefits are cut, older workers will keep
their jobs longer and younger workers will find less demand for their
services. Consequently, the younger generations will have greater diffi-
culty securing employment commensurate with their skills, and likely
will have smaller salaries.2 4 These smaller salaries, combined with the
prospect of higher social security taxes, could well convince those workers
that having children-the simplest solution to the problem, because
more children would equal more taxpayers in the future to support the
system-is not in their economic best interests.2 5 Children can be, after
all, "rather costly impediments to material success. "26
In the past, particularly in rural societies, parents were able to recap-
ture part of the investment they made in their children because children
were able to help with chores while in their youth, and subsequently
could tend to their parents once the parents became elderly. Now, "par-
ents no longer hold a unique claim on their children for support in old
age. Instead the state, primarily through programs like Social Security
and Medicare, redistributes an ever-increasing share of the human capital
parents create to all members of society. ' '27 Consequently, there is less of
an economic incentive for parents to have large families in the present
day. Concededly, while there are certain tax advantages to having chil-
dren,28 the current tax credits and write-offs are not even remotely close
to offsetting the costs of raising these future workers.29 In fact, when
comparing the tax benefits of children to the financial demands of main-
taining a middle-class lifestyle, it becomes clear that our modern econ-
omy actually creates perverse incentives that cause couples to have fewer
children (if any). Such an economic model cannot, and will not, sustain
itself.30
How did we get to this point? What was the impetus for the falling
fertility rates that ultimately will lead to population decline in America?
The answer is remarkably simple: we stopped having babies. The Baby
Boom, which lasted from the end of the Second World War through the
mid-1960s, provided an influx of new taxpayers for future years and a
short-term benefit to the Social Security system. However, when birth
rates began to drop in the mid-1960s, a problem arose. Not only did
24. Id. at 60.
25. LONGMAN, supra note 6, at 22.
26. Id. at 31. See infa Part VI-A for a discussion of the cost of raising children.
27. LONGMAN, supra note 6, at 141-142.
28. See infra Part VI.A. for a discussion of the current tax breaks for having chil-
dren, as well as suggestions on how the tax code can be revised to promote sustainable
fertility rates.
29. LONGMAN, supra note 6, at 146.
30. Id. at 145.
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birth rates decline-they declined drastically,3' raising two questions: (1)
With fewer future taxpayers, who would pay for the retirement benefits
of the Boomers?; and (2) What were the likely causes of the sudden end
of the Boom? Before attempting to answer these questions, though, we
must have a rudimentary understanding of the demographics at issue.
III. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE TOTAL FERTILITY RATE
Assuming an absence of immigration, each woman must have, on
average, 2.1 children during the course of her childbearing years for the
human population to remain stable over time.32 The math is easy: two
parents must yield two children for the population to remain static.
33 If
each woman does not average 2.1 children, human population eventually
declines. 34 Thus, this 2.1 figure is commonly referred to as the "replace-
ment rate," the reproduction level at which we, as a species, will merely
replace ourselves. 3
5
The average number of children that women bear over the course of
their childbearing years is referred to as the total fertility rate (TFR).36 If,
for example, the average woman in a country has four children in her
childbearing years, the TFR for that country is 4.0. 7 Problems arise
when the TFR falls below the replacement rate of 2.1 for an extended
period of time. In the United States, the TFR has been at or below the
replacement rate of 2.1 for over 35 years.3 8 If the TFR continues to stay
below replacement levels, the consequences of population decline will be
made manifest.
A low TFR, however, does not immediately translate into a shrink-
ing population. It takes a number of generations for a below-replacement
fertility rate to take full effect, especially when it has been preceded by a
significant baby boom like the one that occurred in the United States
following the Second World War. A generation after our Baby Boom in
America, even though the TFR began to fall, the overall number of births
31. See infra notes 68-76 and accompanying text.
32. BIRTH DEARTH, supra note 2, at 4. The 2.1 children-per-woman minimum
does not take into account the effects of immigration on a population. Id. Although
immigration plays'a role in maintaining sustainable population levels, its aggregate effects
on the United States' population are beyond the scope of this Note.
33. Id. at 21. The reason that the .1 is included is because (a) some children do
not survive to adulthood, when they too would have the potential to become parents, and
(b) there are slightly more males than females born each year. Id. at 22.
34. See Thomas J. Espenshade et al., The Surprising Global Variation in Replace-
ment Fertility, 22 POPULATION REs. & POL'Y REv. 575, 582 (2003) ("Only among the
more developed countries is the level of replacement fertility typically within 1 of 2.1.").
35. BIRTH DEARTH, supra note 2, at 15.
36. BEN J. WATrENBERG, FEWER: How THE NEW DEMOGRAPHY OF DEPOPULA-
TION WILL SHAPE OUR FUTURE 8 (2004) [hereinafter FEWER].
37. Id.
38. Stein, supra note 1.
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stayed at roughly the same level.3 9 This can be easily explained. Because
there were more women of child-bearing age (as a result of the Baby
Boom), the crude birth rate was able to stay roughly the same, even
though each individual mother was having fewer babies.4" The following
generations, though, are actually the ones that determine whether the
population will shrink. In other words, if the grandchildren and great-
grandchildren of the Boomers continue to have children at a rate below
the replacement level, then the American population will gradually
decline. The Boomers will eventually die, and their grandchildren and
great-grandchildren have not had (and presumably will not have) enough
children to replace them. 4 If the concept still seems nebulous, consider
the following analogy:
[T]hink of a train accelerating up a hill. If the engine stalls, the
train will still move forward for a while, but its loss of momentum
implies that it will soon be moving backwards, and at ever-greater
speed. So it is when fertility rates shift from above to below
replacement levels.
The equivalent of the hill is death itself, which is always pushing
against any increase in human population. The equivalent of the
engine is a fertility rate that consistently produces more births
than deaths. When fertility falls below replacement levels, the
population continues to increase for a while through sheer force of
momentum. But this momentum is a dwindling legacy of a past
effort when fertility rates were still above replacement levels.
42
During the Boomer years, this was not a problem. From 1946 to 1964,
the United States' TFR was at least 2.94 children per woman. 4 3 How-
ever, the national TFR first dipped below this level in 1965, and had
fallen all the way below replacement level by 1972. 44 The United States'
TFR has never been above the replacement level since. 45 The question
now is, why? What caused this drastic plummet in the fertility rate?
39. BIRTH DEARTH, supra note 2, at 26. The crude birth rate is another way to
measure population change and is calculated by looking at the number of births per every
one thousand people in the adult population. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 28. This point about "replacing" the Baby Boomer generation is meant
in only demographic terms; it is not meant to have any bearing whatsoever on the value
of particular individuals. I would be remiss if I neglected to emphasize the intrinsic worth
of each and every human being. In that regard, no individual can ever be "replaced" when
he or she passes away.
42. LONGMAN, supra note 6, at 12.
43. BIRTH DEARTH, supra note 2, at 171.
44. Id.
45. Id.; Stein, supra note 1.
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IV. WHY FERTILITY RATES FALL
The total fertility rate can fall for myriad reasons. Factors such as
wealth, education, delayed marriage and delayed childbearing, women in
the labor force, the Women's Liberation movement, high divorce rates,
urbanization, and cohabitation all can play a role in declining fertility.46
First, let's consider the impact of wealth on low fertility rates. Aspi-
rations to affluence-that is, desires to reach or maintain middle- or
upper-class status-often inhibit childbearing. People become accus-
tomed to a certain lifestyle based upon their level of income, and they are
reluctant to part with that income and the amenities it provides in order
to raise children.4 7 Indeed, every decision to bear and raise a child is
accompanied by economic ramifications. The Department of Agriculture
estimates that the cost of raising a middle-class child from birth through
age seventeen is somewhere in the range of $300,000.48 With this in
mind, it should come as no surprise that the data shows fertility rates
decreasing as income rises.
4 9
Education can also play a role in low fertility rates. Demographer
Ben Wattenberg has suggested that the more educated a woman is, the
less likely she is to bear many children.5" This is because women who
pursue higher education are more likely to delay marriage, delay
childbearing, and/or enter the workforce. 51 If and when these women
start having children, they do so within a more limited biological
timeframe than their peers who do not receive post-secondary or post-
graduate educations. Moreover, the Women's Liberation movement,
which certainly played a role in gaining greater access to higher education
and equal employment opportunities for women, contributed to low fer-
tility rates in another way: at the height of the movement in the 1960s
and 1970s, many women rejected the idea of marriage and the family as
constituting the most important component of a woman's life.
52
Although a number of subsequent feminists have reconsidered this view,
lower fertility rates resulted in the short term.
53
Additionally, high rates of divorce can have a negative impact on
the TFR. A woman who is divorced is often removed, temporarily if not
46. Id. at 129.
47. Id. at 120.
48. MARK LINO, U.S. DEPT. OF AGRIC., EXPENDITURES ON CHILDREN BY FAMI-
LIES, 2007, at ii (2008) (Table ES1. Estimated annual expenditures on a child by hus-
band-wife families, overall United States 2007), available at http://www.cnpp.usda.gov/
publications/CRC/crc2007.pdf [hereinafter USDA REPORT].
49. BIRTH DEARTH, supra note 2, at 120.
50. Id. at 119-120.
51. Id. Concededly, women who enter the workforce contribute to the GDP, thus
alleviating some of the economic problems discussed in Part II.
52. Id. at 127.
53. Id
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permanently, from the pool of potential mothers.5 4 As divorce rates
climb, the TFR can be expected to drop, because the pool of potential
mothers theoretically shrinks with each divorce. 55 A comparison of the
divorce statistics from the Baby Boom era with today's statistics lends
credence to this theory. For example, in the Boom year 1960, when the
TFR was 3.65,56 there were 2.2 divorces for every 1,000 members of the
population. 57 By comparison, in 2003, when the TFR was down to
2.0,58 there were 3.5 divorces for every 1,000 members of the popula-
tion. 59 This 2003 divorce rate of 3.5 represents more than a 60%
increase over the 1960 divorce rate. Is it really all that surprising that an
increase in the divorce rate has been accompanied by a parallel decline in
fertility?
Another factor contributing to a low TFR is urbanization. In the
late eighteenth century, when the majority of Americans still lived on
farms, children were seen as an economic asset, as they could work to
contribute to the success of the family enterprise. However, in an urban
or suburban setting, children present less economic value because there is
a lack of meaningful work for them to do to contribute to the family's
economic well-being. In fact, children may often present a net financial
drain on the family and create a need for both parents to work outside
the home. °
Somewhat surprisingly, cohabitation also leads to lower fertility
rates.6 ' Although many cohabiting relationships are sexual in nature, pro-
creation is often not the participants' desired result. Because cohabiting
individuals are in a relationship that, by design, is less permanent than
marriage, they are often reluctant to bring children into the world, for
children would impose permanence on their union. Consequently, many
cohabiting couples are inclined to adopt a contraceptive mentality so that
they may consider their relationship less binding and deem their sexual
54. Id. at 125.
55. Id Presumably, many divorced women do not attempt to conceive a child
without a partner, although this is certainly not the case in every instance.
56. Id. at 171.
57. National Center for Health Statistics, Summary Report: Final Divorce Statistics,
1970, 23 MONTHLY VITAL STAT. REP., Supplement 2, May 2, 1974, at 2, available at
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/datalmvsr/supp/mv23-O2s2acc.pdf.
58. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, QuICKSTATs: TOTAL
FERTILITY RATES, BY STATE - UNITED STATES, 2003 (Morbidity & Mortality Wkly.
Rep., Dec. 16, 2005), available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/PDF/wk/mm5449.pdf.
59. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, FASTSTATS: MARRIAGE
AND DIVORCE, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/divorce.htm (last visited April 10, 2010).
60. BIRTH DEARTH, supra note 2, at 119.
61. Id. at 129.
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activity to be without consequence.6 2 This mentality might well be at the
root of declining fertility rates.
In its most basic terms, "the contraceptive mentality is a mentality
of not wanting babies."6 3 This mindset embraces both contraception and
abortion as viable methods of avoiding pregnancy. Logically, the two
practices are inextricably linked, for "the contraceptive mentality, in
practice, requires abortion as a backup."6 4 It comes as no surprise, then,
that after contraception was legalized for married couples in 1965,65 and
for unmarried individuals in 1972,66 abortion would become legal
nationwide shortly thereafter.6 7 To what extent, though, did the wide-
spread availability of contraception and abortion impact fertility rates?
V. THE BIRTH(?) OF THE CONTRACEPTIVE MENTALITY
During most of the Baby Boom, the TFR exceeded 3.0.68 In 1965,
however, the total fertility rate suddenly dropped below 3.0 for the first
time.69 Although the factors previously discussed undoubtedly played a
role, a number of them, such as aspirations to wealth and urbanization,
were also at play in the prior Boomer years, and yet the TFR remained
relatively high. So what changed in 1965?
That year, the United States Supreme Court declared contraception
legal for married couples in Griswold v. Connecticut.70 In the years follow-
ing that decision, fertility rates continued to drop, but still stayed slightly
above the replacement rate.71 Then, in 1972, for the first time in the
nation's recorded history, the TFR fell below the replacement rate of
2. 1.72 That same year, the Supreme Court exacerbated the "baby bust"
via its decision in Eisenstadt v. Baird, which extended the legal right to
contraceptives to unmarried individuals. 73 That decision, coupled with
62. But see JENNIFER ROBACK MORSE, SMART SEX 67-92 (2005) (explaining why
the term "reproductive freedom" is a misnomer).
63. Charles E. Rice, Implications of the Coming Retreat from Roe v. Wade, 4 J.
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & PoL'Y 1, 13 (1988).
64. Charles E. Rice, A Cultural Tour of the Legal Landscape: Reflections on Cardinal
Georges Law and Culture, 1 Ave RIA L. REv. 81, 98 (2003).
65. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
66. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
67. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
68. BIRTH DEarTH, supra note 2, at 171.
69. Id.
70. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485.
71. BIRT DEARTH, supra note 2, at 171. In 1965, the TFR dropped to 2.91; in
1966, to 2.72; in 1967, to 2.56; in 1968 and 1969, to 2.46. In 1970, it rose slightly to
2.48, and in 1971 the TFR dropped noticeably yet again, to 2.27. Id.
72. The TFR in 1972 was 2.01. BiRTH DEARTH, supra note 2, at 171.
73. 405 U.S. 438, 443 (1972) (holding that statutes prohibiting contraception
violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). Note that the Court
made its decision in mid-March, 1972. As a result, its decision likely had very little effect
2010]
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Roe v. Wade and the subsequent nationwide legalization of abortion in
1973, 71 could explain why the TFR has lingered well below the replace-
ment level for decades.7 5 In fact, the American TFR has not exceeded the
replacement rate since 1971, the year immediately preceding Eisenstadt.76
Although contraception and abortion may not have been the sole
causes of lower fertility rates, they certainly played an integral role. Part
of the problem in determining precise causality stems from a lack of any
reliable means of measuring contraceptive use, which thereby precludes
an accurate assessment of the number of children who have been pre-
vented from coming into existence. 77 Nevertheless, data gathered by the
United Nations reveals that as the availability of contraceptives has
increased in the United States, fertility rates have decreased. 7s This phe-
nomenon could perhaps be dismissed as mere coincidence if it were only
happening domestically, but the trend has been observed across the
globe.79 That is, regardless of locale, fertility rates typically drop when
contraception becomes widespread. From a pragmatic standpoint, it is
hardly surprising that there is a near-universal correlation between the
use of products that are intended to prevent pregnancies and an overall
drop in the fertility rate.
Abortion presents a much easier case. The Centers for Disease Con-
trol and Prevention (CDC) has kept abortion statistics since 1969, thus
enabling quick calculations of how many children have been aborted
on the TFRs for that year, but may have had significant effects on the national TFR for
the following year.
74. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-154 (1973) (explaining that the right of
privacy extends to a woman's decision whether to terminate a pregnancy).
75. BIRTH DEARTH, supra note 2, at 171.
76. The American TFR hit the replacement level of 2.1 for the first time since
1972 in 2007. Stein, supra note 1. The TFR estimates for 2009 are yet again below
replacement level, at 2.05. CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK,
COUNTRY COMPARISONS-ToTAL FERTILITY RATE, https://www.cia.gov/library/publi-
cations/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2127rank.html (last visited April 10, 2010) [here-
inafter WORLD FACTBOOK].
77. Although it is possible to track contraceptive distribution and sales, it is quite
another matter to accurately record whether those contraceptives were actually used in
any given sexual act.
78. UNITED NATIONS POPULATION DIVISION, WORLD POPULATION PROSPECTS:
THE 2008 REvISION, http://esa.un.org/unpp (follow "Country profile" hyperlink; then
select "United States," "Medium variant," Start Year: 1950," "End Year: 2010" and "Dis-
play) (last visited June 25, 2010). The report shows, for example, that from 1955 to
1960, years in which contraceptive use was not legal across the nation, the average TFR
was 3.71. Forty years later, in the time period from 1995 to 2000 and during which
contraceptive use was legal, the average TFR was 1.99. Id.
79. Id. According to Ben Wattenberg's research, which is based on data culled
from the United Nations Population Division, worldwide fertility has fallen as contracep-
tive use has increased. FEWER, supra note 36, at 99.
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since that year.8" In 1973, the year of Roe, 615,831 children were legally
aborted.8" By 1978, just over five years later, the annual total had nearly
doubled, to 1,157,776.82 The abortion total climbed all the way to
1,429,247 in 1990, and the CDC estimates that in recent years,8 3 the
United States has aborted more than 800,000 children per year.84 This
number, in fact, may be too conservative, as the National Abortion Fed-
eration estimates the figure at over 1.3 million annually.8 5 Abortion,
therefore, has had a rather significant and well-documented effect on fer-
tility rates. For further evidence, consider the abortion ratio, as reported
by the CDC: for every 1,000 live births, 233 children are aborted. 86 In
other words, nearly one out of every five children in this country is
aborted.87 Put into proper perspective, the data illustrates the fact that
since 1974, we have been aborting more than 20 percent of our nation's
potential taxpayers.8 8
It would be wise to take action immediately to stall, if not reverse,
the oncoming population decline. Yet in order to do so, perhaps we
should first ask who is responsible. Perhaps we should start by determin-
ing which group has had the most dramatic impact on fertility rates, and
specifically encourage that group to have more children. Perhaps that
group could then become the key to the solution, rather than the root of
the problem. But who comprises that group?
Low fertility rates in the United States are most attributable to the
choices of the middle and upper-middle class.8 9 As demographer Ben
Wattenberg's research has revealed, "It is a straight class issue. It is an
issue of the non-poor and the well-educated. It is, in short, a middle-class
problem. If we are seeking change, we should know who the prime target
80. SoNYA B. GAMBLE ET AL., CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVEN-
TION, ABORTION SURVEILLANCE -UNITED STATES, 2005 at 1 (Morbidity & Mortality
Wkly. Rep., November 28, 2008), available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/
mmwrbtml/ss5713al.htm [hereinafter MMWR Report]. Three states-California, Loui-
siana, and New Hampshire-did not report abortion statistics in 2005. Id.
81. Id. at 13.
82. Id.
83. From 1988 to 2005, expectant mothers in the United States aborted at least
800,000 children per year. Id. at tbl. 2.
84. Id. at 14-15. Bear in mind, however, that California usually does not report
its abortion statistics. In 1997, the last year that California reported, over 23% of U.S.
abortions were performed in the state. If we assume that California is still responsible for
roughly 23% of abortions, then well over one million abortions are performed in the
United States each year. Id. at 6, 15.
85. SUSAN DUDLEY, NATIONAL ABORTION FEDERATION, WOMEN WHO HAVE
ABORTIONS (Rev. 2003), http://www.prochoice.org/pubs-research/publications/
downloads/about_abortion/womenwho.have..abortions.pdf.
86. MMWR Report, supra note 80, at 1, 16.
87. This estimate excludes calculations for miscarriages.
88. MMWR Report, supra note 80, at 16.
89. BIRTH DEARTH, supra note 2, at 77.
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audience is: the culprit is the middle class-white, black, Asian, and His-
panic,"90 Therefore, if we want to avoid future population decline, we
need to encourage fertility; and, if we want to encourage fertility, we
must begin with those who are most at fault for our current low fertility
rates-the middle class.
VI. THE SOLUTIONS: THE TAx CODE AND
THE CATHOLIC CHURCH
A government-endorsed pronatalist policy would be the most effi-
cient means of combating the contraceptive mentality and boosting fer-
tility. Two steps can be taken to achieve this objective: (A) Congress can
revise the tax code (Code) to provide couples with greater financial
incentives for raising children; and (B) the nation can dedicate itself to an
adherence to the natural law, which, according to the interpretation of
the Catholic Church, mandates rejection of the contraceptive mental-
ity.9 t Both the secular and the ecclesiastical solution should cause a rise
in fertility rates if implemented independently, but they will be even
more effective if adopted in tandem.
A. The Secular Solution: Reform of the Tax Code
The tax code, as of the taxable year 2008, does not provide enough
financial incentives to encourage middle class couples to raise children. 92
Although the Code offers certain tax benefits for childrearing, most of
the exemptions and credits offered fall far short of what couples need to
offset the costs of raising a family. Furthermore, most of the tax expendi-
tures93 that promote childrearing do not extend any financial benefit
beyond a couple's second child.94 The Code, therefore, does not
encourage couples to have more than two children, as the couple must
always bear the brunt of the economic burden occasioned by a third
child. However, to avoid the problem of falling fertility rates, couples
need to be encouraged to have more than two (i.e., at least three) chil-
90. Id.
91. See generally Pope Paul VI, Humanae Vitae: Encyclical of Pope Paul VI on the
Regulation of Birth (July 25, 1968) [hereinafter Humanae Vitae].
92. Defining "the middle class" is a tricky enterprise and no universally agreed-
upon definition exists. For the purposes of this Note, however, the author will presume
that the middle class encompasses those married couples filing joint tax returns who
earned between $65,100 and $357,700 in taxable income in 2008. This grouping repre-
sents all married joint filers in the 25 percent, 28 percent, and 33 percent tax brackets for
the taxable year 2008. Rev. Proc. 2007-66, 2007-45 I.R.B. 970.
93. A tax expenditure is nothing more than "a feature of the tax law which exists
to further some non-tax goal." ALAN GUNN & LARRY D. WARD, CASES, TEXr AND
PROBLEMS ON FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION (6th ed. 2006).
94. Specifically, benefits are capped at "2 or more" children in three Code provi-
sions: I.R.C. § 21 (West Supp. 2008); I.RC. § 23 (West Supp. 2008); and I.R.C. § 32
(West Supp. 2008).
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dren. If the Code were revised, extending enough aid in tax credits and
exemptions to shelter from taxation the income necessary to raise three
children, many middle-class couples would begin to view three-child
families as an economically viable option. As a consequence, fertility rates
should rise.
Each year, the United States Department of Agriculture estimates
the cost of raising a child from birth through age seventeen. For 2007," 5
the Department of Agriculture reported that, for a married couple with
pre-tax income above $77,100 (which would ostensibly include the mid-
dle and upper-middle class), it would cost roughly $689,950.50 to raise
three children from birth through age seventeen. 96 That amounts to an
average of $38,330.60 in child-related expenses per year.9 7 For that same
year, though, the Code might only allow the couple to claim $10,500 in
exemptions and $1,200 in credits.9 8
To ameliorate this problem, Congress should amend those sections
of the Code that most directly incentivize couples to raise children. Spe-
cifically, Congress should focus on (a) section 23, which offers a credit
for adoption expenses; (b) section 32, which permits an earned income
tax credit; (c) section 24, which outlines the child tax credit; (d) section
21, which allows a credit for household and dependent care services nec-
essary for gainful employment; and (e) section 151, which sets forth per-
sonal exemption amounts. Many of these sections already provide
adequately for the poor, but they neglect to account for the needs of the
middle class, which is the primary group Congress should seek to benefit
when revising the Code.99 Congress could refer to the Department of
Agriculture's cost-of-child-raising publications to determine the esti-
mated costs that middle class families incur in raising children, and then
95. At the time of this writing, this was the most recent report issued by the
USDA.
96. USDA REPORT, supra note 48, at ii.
97. Id. Table ES 1 only presents the costs of raising the younger child in a two-
child family, and estimates the overall cost of raising that younger child at $298,680.
Costs for the older child are presumed to be "about the same." The footnotes to the table,
however, provide instructions for calculating the costs of raising three children to age 18.
The overall cost of raising a child, as presented in the table, is to be multiplied by 0.77. In
this case, that calculation would yield a result of $229.983.60. As this total only repre-
sents one child, it must be multiplied by three to adequately account for the costs of
raising three children. The resulting product is $689,950.80, representing the cost of
raising three children from birth through age 17. To determine the average cost of raising
children per year, simply divide $689,950.80 by the 18 years that the couple pays for
each child, for a yearly cost of $38,330.60. Id.
98. Imagine a couple with adjusted gross income of $200,000 and three qualifying
children. These taxpayers would qualify for personal exemptions of $3,500 per child, and
a $1,200 credit for household and dependent care services, but no child tax credit and no
benefit from the earned income tax credit. These calculations are discussed at length,
infra notes 100-117 and accompanying text.
99. See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
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alleviate those costs by increasing the amounts allowable for credits and
exemptions. By using the Code as a form of partial subsidy to families,
Congress can promote a pronatalist agenda that should, in turn, pay
remarkable dividends in future decades.
Imagine an upper-middle class couple-Mr. and Mrs. Lawprof-
with an adjusted gross income (AGI) of $200,000 in 2008, who already
have two children and are contemplating adopting a third from overseas,
but are concerned about the potential expense. Section 23 of the Code
offers couples a credit of up to $11,650 in adoption-related expenses, but
the Lawprofs would only be eligible for a portion of this.100 Section
23(b) of the Code begins phaseouts of this adoption credit once a tax-
payer reaches $174,730 in AGI, and completely bars taxpayers with AGI
of $214,730 or above from receiving any of the credit. 1 ' As a result, Mr.
and Mrs. Lawprof, who earn between $174,730 and $214,730, would be
affected by the phaseout. Once their AGI is taken into account, they
could claim a credit of approximately $7,360."2 If they were to spend
more than this in adopting the child, though, the Code would offer no
further benefit.
For the sake of argument, assume that the Lawprofs decided to go
through with the adoption and incur the additional expenses. They now
have three children, and can expect to spend about $38,330 per year to
raise them. 10 3 How does the Code help this family cope with their
expenses? First, they could look to the earned income tax credit (EITC)
of section 32 for help, but they would discover that they are not eligible
for this relief.10 4 The EITC offers assistance only to lower and lower-
middle class taxpayers. Anyone who earned more than $41,646 in 2008,
like the Lawprof family, is ineligible for the credit. 10 5 Thus, a family like
the Lawprofs must look elsewhere.
Having derived little benefit from sections 23 and 32, the Lawprofs
could then turn to section 24, the child tax credit. Typically, families
receive $1,000 per qualifying child, with no limits on how many qualify-
100. I.R.C. § 23 (West Supp. 2008). Unless otherwise noted, assume that all nec-
essary inflation adjustments for 2008 have been calculated according to Rev. Proc.
2007-66, 2007-45 I.R.B. 970.
101. I.R.C. § 23(b)(2)(A) (West Supp. 2008).
102. Id. To arrive at this figure, take the AGI of the couple-in this case,
$200,000-and subtract the phaseout amount of $174,730. Take the resultant $25,270
and divide by $40,000 to get the appropriate percentage which will be applied against the
maximum credit. In this case, the proper percentage is .63175, which is multiplied
against the $11,650 maximum credit for a credit of $7,359.89 for this family, or approxi-
mately $7,360.
103. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
104. I.R.C. § 32 (West Supp. 2008).
105. Internal Revenue Service, 2008 Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC)-Should
I Claim It?, available at http://apps.irs.gov/app/eitc2008/ProcesslncomeEligibility.do (last
visited April 15, 2009).
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ing children a taxpayer may claim." 6 The Lawprofs might assume, then,
that they would be entitled to a $3,000 credit-$ 1,000 for each child.
Unfortunately for them, they cannot claim this credit either. Section 24
begins phaseouts of the credit once a taxpayer exceeds $110,000 in AGI.
The credit is to be reduced (but not below zero) by $50 for each $1,000
by which the taxpayer's AGI exceeds the threshold amount of
$110,000.107 Because the Lawprofs make $200,000 per year, they have
exceeded the threshold ninety times. A $50 reduction of the credit taken
ninety times would be $4,500, and only sixty of those ninety reductions
would be needed to completely eliminate the $3,000 credit that they
were hoping to receive.
This family is not entirely neglected by the Code, however. If the
Lawprofs paid for dependent care services for their children so that both
Mr. and Mrs. Lawprof could work, they would be able to claim a credit
equal to 20 percent of whatever they paid for childcare expenses.10 8
However, no credit would be allowable beyond 20 percent of the first
$6,000 spent.' 0 9 Assuming this family paid at least $6,000 in dependent
care expenses for their children while they worked, they would be enti-
tled to a tax credit of $1,200 ($600 per child). If they did not pay for
child care services, however, they would not be entitled to receive any of
this credit.
The final portion of the Code that the Lawprofs should consult for
a potential tax break is section 151. Section 151 grants personal exemp-
tions to each taxpayer for his or her dependents, which include the tax-
payer's children." 0 For the taxable year 2008, a taxpayer could claim an
exemption for his or her dependents in the amount of $3,500 each."'
Phaseouts of this exemption amount begin once a taxpayer's AGI exceeds
$239,950, and since the Lawprofs made only $200,000, they are unaf-
fected by the phaseout." 2 They are thus entitled to an exemption of
$3,500 for each of their three children - a total of $10,500.
106. I.R.C. § 24(a) (West Supp. 2008).
107. I.R.C. § 24(b)(2)(A) (West Supp. 2008).
108. I.R.C. § 24(a)(2) (West Supp. 2008).
109. I.R.C. 21(c)(2) (West Supp. 2008). A family can claim a credit of the appli-
cable percentage (here, 20 percent) of $3,000 in expenses in the case of one child, and 20
percent of $6,000 in the case of two children. Id.
110. I.R.C. § 151 (West Supp. 2008). Dependents are defined in Section 152(a)
as a "qualifying child"; "qualifying child" is later defined in Section 152(c)(2) as "a child
of the taxpayer or a descendant of such a child."
11. I.R.C..§ 151(d)(1) (West Supp. 2008).
112. I.R.C. § 151(d)(3)(C) (West Supp. 2008). Families with an AGI above
$239,950 can calculate their deduction as follows: For every $2,500, or fraction thereof,
that their AGI exceeds $150,000, each personal exemption is to be reduced by 2 percent.
I.R.C. § 151(d)(3)(A)-(B) (West Supp. 2008). However, for the taxable years 2008 and
2009, the phaseouts are to be reduced by one-third. Thus, the applicable reduction per-
centage must be multiplied by one-third, which then must be multiplied by the general
$3,500 exemption amount. I.R.C. § 151 (d)(3)(E) (West Supp. 2008). This product must
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In sum, the Lawprofs would be eligible for a $1,200 dependent care
credit, $10,500 in personal exemptions for the children, and a $7,360
one-time adoption credit. Compare these tax expenditures to the
$38,330 that the USDA has estimated as the cost of raising three chil-
dren each year. The adoption credit would be of some assistance in the
year of adoption, but not subsequently. Therefore, in most years, a family
such as the Lawprofs would be eligible only for the personal exemptions
and the dependent care credit. How much benefit, though, do those
exemptions and credits actually provide?
First, we must understand that tax credits are a dollar-for-dollar
reduction of tax liability.1 13 To roughly estimate how much income a tax
credit shelters for a family, simply divide the tax credit by the applicable
marginal rate. A family like the Lawprofs, who make $200,000 a year,
would fall in the twenty-eight percent marginal tax bracket for the taxa-
ble year 2008.114 Therefore, to determine how much their $1,200 depen-
dent care credit is "actually" worth, the Lawprofs would divide $1,200 by
twenty-eight percent, resulting in $4,285.71 in sheltered income. They
would then add this to their $10,500 in personal exemptions-which are
not dollar for dollar reductions in tax liability, but rather reduce taxable
income-for a total of $14,785.71 sheltered in a normal year. This total
falls more than $20,000 below the USDA estimates of the annual cost of
raising three children. Only if the adoption credit were factored in would
this family shelter enough money to cover the nearly $40,000 it would
cost to raise the children in a given year.115
In response to the financial burden borne by many American fami-
lies, a cynic might reply, "So what? No one is making these people have
children. If they don't want to incur the cost, then they don't need to
have kids." But that is precisely the point. When couples are forced to
choose between children and wealth, some will undoubtedly choose
wealth. If enough choose wealth, sooner or later the country ceases to
replace its taxpayers at a sustainable rate, which ultimately leads to the
negative consequences of population decline.
The solution to this problem is not difficult. The Code should be
revised to alleviate the costs a taxpayer normally incurs in raising three
then be subtracted from $3,500 to determine the applicable exemption amount for each
eligible member of the household. Id.
113. Tax credits do not reduce the taxpayer's gross income. Rather, credits reduce
the overall tax liability. Imagine a taxpayer with gross income of $100,000, pre-credit tax
liability of $25,000, and $5,000 in credits. This $5,000 in credits would get subtracted
from the overall tax liability of $20,000 (instead of being subtracted from the gross
.income of $100,000).
114. Rev. Proc. 2007-66, 2007-45 I.R.B. 970.
115. If the adoption credit were factored in for 2008, the family would have an
overall tax savings of $41,071.42. The adoption credit itself, being worth $7,360, would
translate to $26,285.71 in tax savings ($7,360 divided by a 28 percent marginal tax rate).
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children, which would thus create incentives for more taxpayers to have
three-child families. An increase in the number of three-child families
should help to boost the TFR above the replacement rate. Up to this
point, this Note has used the USDA estimates for child-rearing costs foe
an upper-middle class family, but an even better figure for Congress to
use in revising the Code would be the USDA's estimated costs for a
lower, or lower-middle class, family." 6 For a family with a pre-tax
income of $45,800 or less-those in the lower or lower-middle class-
the USDA estimates the cost of raising three children at $19,034.40 per
year.'1 7 Thus, Congress could use this estimate as a baseline for the bare
minimum of what it costs a family to raise three children each year and
amend the Code accordingly.
Congress should begin by looking at the personal exemptions
granted under section 151 of the Code. The Code does not place a cap
on the number of personal exemptions that a taxpayer may claim, so a
family with three children would typically be entitled to a deduction of
$10,500 ($3,500 per child) per year, which is more than half of the
estimated costs of raising the three children.118 However, the problem
with personal exemptions is that they do not apply to everyone. Section
151(d)(3) phases out the personal exemptions for taxpayers who exceed
$239,950 in AGI," 9 consequently destroying the ability of many middle
class taxpayers to claim the credit. 12' The practical effect is that lower,
116. The USDA breaks down the cost of raising a child into three pre-tax income
groups: (i) those who earn less than $45,800; (ii) those who earn between $45,800 and
$77,100; and (iii) those who earn more than $77,100. The cost of raising a child
increases as the taxpayer's income increases. USDA REPORT, supra note 48, at ii. There
are many plausible explanations for this, but one possibility is that this is the result of the
parents' desire to provide the child with a standard of living commensurate with their
own, rather than simply providing for the child's basic needs. Congress is likely to be
unconcerned with compensating parents for maintaining the higher standard of living for
their child, but might be more receptive to assisting parents in recovering expenses
directly related to the child's basic needs. For this reason, the costs of raising a child in the
lowest income bracket are probably the most accurate estimate of the actual costs of
raising a child, and will be presumed to be so for the purposes of this analysis.
117. Id. The USDA estimates the cost of raising one child from birth to age eigh-
teen at $148,320. Table ES1, contained within the USDA Report, gives instructions to
multiply this number by .77 for a child in a three-child family, which results in an aver-
age cost of $114,206.40 to raise one child in a three-child family where the pre-tax
income of the parents is $45,800 or less. This $114,206.40 must then be multiplied by
three to obtain the total for raising three children from birth to age eighteen
($342,619.20), and then divided by eighteen to determine the average cost per year,
which is $19,034.40.
118. I.R.C. § 151(d)(1), (4) (West Supp. 2008).
119. Currently, this section of the Code reduces the phaseout, but this provision
expires in 2010. The applicable phaseout for 2008 begins at $239,950 and completely
eliminates any personal exemptions for taxpayers who exceed $362,450 in AGI. I.R.C.
§ 151(d)(3)(E) (West Supp. 2008).
120. I.R.C. § 151(d)(3)(A)-(C) (West Supp. 2008).
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lower-middle-, and middle-middle-class taxpayers are financially
encouraged to have large families, while upper-middle class taxpayers
derive no economic benefit. Thus, these high-income taxpayers may
decide to have few children, if any. To remedy this problem, Congress
should eliminate the phaseouts of dependent-based personal exemptions
so that all taxpayers will have the same incentive to raise large families.
Similarly, section 24, which ordinarily allows a $1,000 child tax
credit, completely phases out the credit once joint-filing taxpayers reach
$130,000 in AGI. 12 1 As a result, many middle-class taxpayers are pre-
vented from receiving any benefit under this section. To encourage these
higher-income taxpayers to raise children, Congress should eliminate the
phaseout provision altogether (or drastically increase the threshold at
which the phaseouts begin) so that all members of the middle class will
have an opportunity to claim the credit. Furthermore, Congress should
amend the definition of "qualifying child" in section 24, which is cur-
rently defined as "a qualifying child of the taxpayer. . . who has not
attained age 17. " 122 The USDA child-cost estimates are based on
assumptions that taxpayers will pay to raise their children through the age
of seventeen, rather than up to the age of seventeen, so the "qualifying
child" definition in section 24 should be increased by one year, thus
allowing a credit for all children of a taxpayer who have not yet attained
the age of eighteen.
The effect of such changes to section 24 would be significant. Con-
sider, for example, a taxpayer in the 28 percent bracket, such as the Law-
prof family mentioned previously. A tax credit of $3,000-$1,000 per
child for three dependent children-would net tax savings of more than
$10,700.123 This, combined with the $10,500 that could be claimed in
personal exemptions, would protect from taxation the income required to
raise three children.' 2 4 Taxpayers in lower tax brackets would shelter even
more. 12 5 Even joint filers in the 35 percent tax bracket would shelter over
$8,571 in income. When combined with the $10,500 sheltered via per-
sonal exemptions, these high-end taxpayers would net a tax savings of
$19,071-over thirty dollars more than the estimated minimum costs of
raising the children.
121. I.R.C. §§ 24(a)-(b) (West Supp. 2008).
122. I.R.C. § 24(c)(1) (West Supp. 2008).
123. To arrive at this figure, take $3,000, which is the amount of the credit, and
divide by the percentage listed in the applicable tax bracket. Here, $3,000 divided by
28% yields a result of over $10,700.
124. Recall that the minimum cost of raising three children was estimated as
$19,034.40, whereas taxpayers with the highest incomes would pay an average of
$38,330.60 per year for three children. USDA REPORT, supra note 48, at ii.
125. For married taxpayers filing jointly with three children, those in the 25 per-
cent tax bracket would shelter $12,000 in income, and those in the 15 percent bracket
would shelter $20,000 in income.
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Making only these minor adjustments to the Code would signifi-
cantly lessen the economic burdens felt by taxpayers raising three chil-
dren. Yet, still more could be done. Further revisions could be made to
entice taxpayers to raise three-child families. For example, section 21,
which offers a credit for dependent-care expenses, does not provide any
benefits beyond the first two children. 126 Specifically, subsection (c) dic-
tates that a taxpayer may not claim more than $3,000 in employment-
related expenses incurred for the care of one qualifying child, and may
not claim more than $6,000 for "2 or more qualifying individuals."' 127
The structural setup of this provision implies that Congress felt that
$3,000 was sufficient for the child-care expenses of one child, and
another $3,000 (a total of $6,000) was sufficient for the child-care
expenses of a second child. Why not then raise the cap another $3,000
(to $9,000 total) for child-care expenses based on a third child? This
minor adjustment would give taxpayers a benefit, however small, for hav-
ing more than two children.1 28 Even taxpayers who qualified for the min-
imum credit would still be entitled to $1,800, which is quite a significant
amount when considered in the context of how much income would
actually be sheltered (over $6,000 for those in the twenty-eight percent
bracket) by such a credit. 129
Section 32, which offers an earned-income tax credit to low-income
taxpayers, should remain largely intact. The main issue with this section
is that it, like section 21, caps the number of qualifying children at two;
that is, taxpayers receive no benefit beyond the second child.' 3 ° Low,
middle, and high-income taxpayers alike should all be encouraged to
have three children, so section 32 should be amended to allow a credit to
low-income taxpayers for "3 or more qualifying children," rather than the
current provision which allows a credit for "2 or more."'' 3 1
Section 23, which permits a credit for adoption-related expenses,
offers couples an initial financial incentive to raise children, but it too is
far from perfect. This section, like many others in the Code, phases out
the credit to reduce its applicability to upper-income taxpayers. 132 Why?
Is it sound social policy to encourage lower and lower-middle class tax-
payers to adopt children, but to withhold the same encouragement from
the upper and upper-middle class? Consider this: a taxpayer who adopts a
126. I.R.C. § 21 (West Supp. 2008).
127. I.R.C. § 21(c)(2) (West Supp. 2008) (emphasis added).
128. This would be a third $600 credit. See supra notes 108-109 and accompany-
ing text for a brief explanation of how this credit is calculated for two children.
129. I.R.C. § 21(a)(2) (West Supp. 2008). Twenty-eight percent applied against
$9,000 in expenses would yield a credit of $1,800, which would roughly translate to
$6,428 sheltered.
130. I.R.C. § 32(b) (West Supp. 2008).
131. Id.
132. I.R.C. § 23(b)(2) (West Supp. 2008).
20101
444 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 24
child with "special needs"-which includes children with physical or
mental handicaps-is entitled to the maximum credit of $11,650, but if
that taxpayer's AGI exceeds the threshold amount, this credit is signifi-
cantly reduced or eliminated entirely. Would it not be better policy to
encourage upper-income taxpayers to adopt special-needs children? After
all, these taxpayers have greater resources at their disposal to care for
children with such needs over the course of their lifetimes. Logic, then,
would dictate that the government should offer these taxpayers as much
incentive as possible to adopt children with special needs, because (a)
upper-income taxpayers have greater financial ability to care for these
children over the long term than lower-income taxpayers, and (b) the
government will be saved the expense of caring for these children should
they not be adopted at all.
Nevertheless, this is beside the point. High-income taxpayers should
not only be encouraged to adopt children with special needs, but to
adopt any child. In promoting a pronatalist agenda, Congress needs to
persuade all families, and specifically middle class families, to raise at least
three children. Provisions that phase out child-related credits for upper-
middle class taxpayers cut against this goal because those taxpayers have
fewer incentives to raise large families. Therefore, the phaseout of the
adoption credit for upper-income families should be eliminated so that
they will have greater incentive to adopt.
At this point, an attentive reader might be thinking, "Wait a min-
ute. How will adoption boost the TFR? Aren't adopted children already
included in the fertility rate?" This is perhaps a valid concern when limit-
ing the discussion solely to domestic adoption. International adoption,
however, is quite another matter. Adopting children from other nations
should alleviate some of the problems associated with low fertility rates
domestically, as international adoption will increase the total number of
individuals counted among the national population, and can thus play a
role in circumventing the dangers of population decline. Moreover,
domestic adoption should still be encouraged, because a governmental
promotion of domestic adoption could help engender a pro-adoptive
mentality on a societal level, which in turn might persuade women with
unplanned pregnancies to forgo elective abortions. If a substantial num-
ber of these women decide to allow their children to be adopted, rather
than to abort them, we will likely see a rise in the TFR.
In summary, Congress should have three general goals when revis-
ing the Code. First, it should use the USDA's minimum estimates of the
costs of raising three children, $19,034.40, as a baseline measurement of
how much income must be sheltered to encourage taxpayers to have
three-child families. Second, all applicable provisions should extend
exemptions and credits to at least the first three qualifying children of the
taxpayer who have not yet attained the age of eighteen, because the
USDA estimates are based on the costs of raising children from birth
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through age seventeen. Third, all phaseouts should be eliminated, or at
least have the threshold amounts for the phaseouts dramatically
increased, so that upper-middle class taxpayers will have greater motiva-
tion to have large families. If these reforms are instituted and taxpayers
are given more economic reasons in favor of having children, middle-
class Americans will be less likely to use the cost of children as an excuse
for small families. Thus a pronatalist revision of the Code would likely
have the effect of boosting our nation's sagging total fertility rates.
133
B. The Ecclesiastical Solution: Adherence
to the Natural Law
In addition to reforming the Code, our nation's citizens and
lawmakers would be wise to heed the message of the Catholic Church,
which is the authentic interpreter and guardian of the natural law.
134
Guided by basic precepts of the natural law, the Church has consistently
promoted pronatalism as a means of combating the Supreme Court's
endorsement of the contraceptive mentality. Her initial response to the
Court was Pope Paul VI's 1968 encyclical letter Humanae Vitae, prof-
fered a mere three years after the Supreme Court's ruling in Griswold.13 5
Similarly, three years after the Supreme Court reaffirmed a woman's right
to have an abortion in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey,136 Pope John Paul II conclusively rejected the Court's ruling by
promulgating his Papal Encyclical Evangelium Vitae.137 Both of these
documents emphatically declare the Church's unequivocal support for
human life at every stage. Moreover, they expressly condemn contracep-
tion and abortion in all cases, regardless of the circumstances.
Pope Paul VI promulgated Humanae Vitae to address the Church's
growing concern over birth regulation, and specifically the regulation
achieved through contraception and abortion. He began his letter by
acknowledging that while children can be a hindrance to wealth, 138 men
and women
are not free to act as they choose in the service of transmitting life,
as if it were wholly up to them to decide what is the right course
133. There is, of course, a tradeoff. The government would necessarily have to
sacrifice substantial tax revenue in the short term so that it might have a broader tax base
in the long term. The precise financial impact that these suggested tax revisions would
have on the government's tax revenue is an interesting question, but is, unfortunately,
beyond the scope of this Note.
134. Humanae Vitae, supra note 91, at § 4.
135. Id.
136. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
137. Pope John Paul II, Evangelium Vitae: Encyclical of Pope Paul l on the Value
and Inviolability of Human Life (March 25, 1995) [hereinafter Evangelium Vitae].
138. Humanae Vitae, supra note 91, at § 2.
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to follow. On the contrary, they are bound to ensure that what
they do corresponds to the will of God the Creator.
139
This divine will, he explained, mandates that conjugal acts may law-
fully140 take place only in the context of the marriage relationship., 4 1
"Each and every marital act," he proclaimed, "must of necessity retain its
intrinsic relationship to the procreation of human life."' 4 2 The marriage
act itself is based upon an inextricable link between unitive and procrea-
tive aspects that were created and ordained by God.143 Man may not, of
his own accord, destroy this connection, for when he attempts to do so
he acts "in opposition to the plan of God and His holy will." 144
Paul, speaking for the Church, thus denounced contraception, abor-
tion, and sterilization, and also expressly rejected any action that takes
place before, during, or after sexual intercourse that specifically aims to
avoid procreation. Such practices, Paul noted, are to be condemned, for
they are "intrinsically wrong."' 4 5 As an alternative to these methods of
birth regulation, Paul suggested couples rely on natural family planning,
a method in which married couples engage in sexual relations only dur-
ing those times of the wife's menstrual cycle which render her infer-
tile.' 4 6 In this way, the couple reduces the likelihood of pregnancy but
does nothing to change the nature of the conjugal act, thereby leaving
themselves open to God's will should He desire to bring new life into the
world. 147
In rejecting the various forms of artificial birth control, the Pope
was quick to point out that he only promoted "the law of God Him-
self."' 48 The Church has been entrusted with the power to authorita-
tively interpret the natural law, he noted, 149 whereas various governments
139. Id. at § 10. Paul's discussion of procreation occurs entirely in the context of
marriage, as the natural law only permits married couples to engage in procreative acts.
Id.
140. This assertion is made in the context of the moral law. Paul traces his author-
ity back to Christ, who communicated his divine power to interpret the moral law to the
Apostles and their successors. Humanae Vitae, supra note 91, at § 4.
141. Id. at §8.
142. Id. at§ 11.
143. Id. at § 12.
144. Id. at § 13.
145. Id. at § 14.
146. Id. at § 16.
147. Id.
148. Id. at § 20.
149. Id. at § 4 ("No member of the faithful could possibly deny that the Church
is competent in her magisterium to interpret the natural moral law."); See also CHARLES
E. RICE, 50 QUESTIONS ON THE NATURAL LAw: WHAT IT Is AND WHY WE NEED IT
235-36 (1999) ("There has to be an ultimate authority [on the natural law] .... Because
an interpreter is needed, the claim of the Catholic Church-that the authoritative inter-
preter is the Pope as the Vicar of Christ, who is God-merits consideration. If not the
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have not.' 50 Consequently, Paul cautioned against affording public
authorities, many of whom disregard the moral law, the power of inter-
preting it. 15 1 These authorities, he warned, could sanction and perhaps
recommend the use of artificial methods of birth control, and might ulti-
mately even require their use. 151
The promulgation of his encyclical suggests that the Pope was dis-
traught, in part, by the Supreme Court's ruling in Griswold. Although
there is no way to measure how many children were denied birth through
Court-approved contraceptive practices, the fact that the TFR dipped
from 2.91 in 1965, when Griswold was decided, to 2.01 by 1972, the
year of Eisenstadt, implies that contraceptive use may have played a major
role in the decline of total fertility rates in those years.' 53 What is certain,
though, is that in the absence of legalized contraception, the United
States' TFR had always been above replacement level.' 54 Thus, heeding
Pope Paul VI's call to avoid contraception could-and likely would-
lead to similar above-replacement level TFRs today, as the United States
is currently closer to the replacement level than it has been at any other
time in the past thirty-five years.'
55
Although Paul's encyclical condemned both contraception and
abortion, its practical application in the United States was limited prima-
rily to contraception until 1973.156 However, after the Roe Court
announced that the fundamental "right of privacy.., is broad enough to
encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her preg-
nancy,"'57 American TFRs began to plummet, culminating in a low of
1.74 in 1976 and hovering between 1.80 and 1.84 for much of the
1980s.' 58 Unlike contraceptive practices, though, which have no way of
being measured, abortion statistics have been kept by the U.S. govern-
ment since 1969.159 Over that span, at least 800,000 unborn children
Pope, who else could adequately serve as the visible moral authority?") [hereinafter 50
QUESTIONS].
150. For a brief introduction to the natural law, see, e.g., J. BUDZISZEWSKI, NATU-
RAL LAW FOR LAWYERS (2006), and CHARLES E. RICE, 50 QUESTIONS ON THE NATU-
RAL LAw: WHAT IT Is & WHY WE NEED IT (rev. ed. 1999).
151. Humanae Vitae, supra note 91, at § 17.
152. Id. ("Who will prevent public authorities from favoring those contraceptive
methods which they consider more effective? Should they regard this as necessary, they
may even impose their use on everyone.").
153. BIRTH DEARTH, supra note 2, at 171.
154. Id. at 14 (discussing American TFRs since 1790), 171 (displaying TFRs from
1945 to 1986).
155. WORLD FACTBOOK, supra note 76.
156. Although various states allowed abortion prior to 1973, the practice was not
permissible on a nationwide scale until Roe v. Wade. 410 U.S. at 139-140 (1973).
157. Id. at 153.
158. BIRTH DEARTH, supra note 2, at 171.
159. MMWR Report, supra note 80, at 1.
20101
448 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 24
have been aborted per year. 160 In an effort to reduce that number, pro-
life advocates chipped away at Roe for nearly twenty years, and the situa-
tion soon merited further review by the Supreme Court. In 1992, the
Court again considered the abortion question in Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey. The Court's plurality opinion in that
case reaffirmed the "central holding" of Roe, re-emphasizing the constitu-
tional protection of a woman's decision whether to terminate her preg-
nancy.16 The Court's opinion led to a second response from the
Vatican.
John Paul II's monumental encyclical Evangelium Vitae ("The Gos-
pel of Life") was designed to passionately reaffirm the Church's respect
for and defense of human life. In that letter, John Paul clearly articulated
papal doctrine, albeit with slight divergences from the teaching of his
predecessor. He used language that paralleled the syntax used by the
United States Supreme Court, 62 and he emphatically rejected the
Court's authority to sanction abortion and contraception.' 63 Further-
more, he refused to accept economic arguments as legitimate bases for
the contraceptive mentality, and instead urged a cultural transformation
that would lead to the promotion of a culture of life. His condemnation
of abortion was particularly emphatic: "I confirm that the direct and
voluntary killing of an innocent human being is always gravely
immoral."'164 Such killing is "always morally evil," he wrote, and "can
never be licit" either as a means or as an end. 165
His teaching was not identical to that of his predecessor, Paul VI,
though in a number of ways the two advanced similar ideas. For example,
John Paul reiterated Paul's teaching that procreation is only for a man
and woman joined together in marriage. 166 Children, he agreed, are "the
supreme gift of marriage," and should be seen as a blessing. 167 He also
affirmed Paul's interpretation of the natural law, acknowledging God as
the sole Lord of life. 168 Moreover, John Paul vigorously condemned all
160. Id. at 13-15 (Table 1: Characteristics of women who obtained legal abor-
tions-United States, 1973-2005). In most years, the number of abortions far exceeded
800,000, peaking at over 1.4 million in 1990. Id.
161. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
860 (1992) ("Whenever it may occur, the attainment of viability may continue to serve as
the critical fact, just as it has done since Roe was decided; which is to say that no change
in Roe' factual underpinning has left its central holding obsolete, and none supports an
argument for overruling it.").
162. See infra notes 176-183 and accompanying text.
163. See infra note 184-187 and accompanying text.
164. Evangelium Vitae, supra note 137, at § 57.
165. Id.
166. Id at §43.
167. Id. at § 26 (quoting Second Vatican Council, Gaudium et Spes [Pastoral Con-
stitution on the Church in the Modern World[ § 50 (1965)).
168. Id at § 39.
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attacks against human life, just as his predecessor and the Second Vatican
Council had,16 9 and expressly denounced abortion and contraception,
which he viewed as "specifically different evils" though "fruits of the
same tree." 170 However, whereas Paul had merely cautioned against giv-
ing governments the authority to permit contraception and abortion,
1 7
John Paul forcefully argued that no government can ever legitimately per-
mit the intentional killing of innocent human beings. 172 No matter what
reason is given, he proclaimed, there is never any justification for taking
innocent human life.1 73 He clarified that the unborn are to be included
in the discussion of innocent human life, because the human experience
begins at the moment of fertilization. 174 Therefore, killing an unborn
child, "in whom the image of God is present, is a particularly serious
sin."175
John Paul's eloquent defense of the unborn adopted the language of
the popular legal parlance, for it was addressed, in part, to the American
judiciary. For example, in Roe, the Court framed the abortion issue in
terms of "a woman's decision." 176 In his letter, John Paul adopted similar
language, advocating that humanity has "the inescapable burden of choos-
ing to be unconditionally pro-life."' 77 Likewise, just as the Roe Court had
described abortion as a "fundamental" right,178 which triggers a strict
scrutiny standard of review, 179 John Paul framed his issue as the "funda-
mental right to life," which should therefore be entitled to the same level
of judicial deference. 8 In addition, John Paul mirrored the infamous
"Mystery Passage" of the Casey decision-which discussed what is "[alt
the heart of liberty" 8 1 -when he asserted that the right to life is "at the
169. Id. at § 3.
170. Id. at § 13.
171. Humanae Vitae, supra note 91, at § 17.
172. Evangelium Vitae, supra note 137, at § 57.
173. Id. at § 58.
174. Id. at § 60.
175. Id. at § 55.
176. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
177. Evangelium Vitae, supra note 137, at § 28 (emphasis added).
178. Roe, 410 U.S. at 152-153 ("[Olnly rights that can be deemed fundamental
... are included in this guaranteed concept of personal privacy .... This right of privacy
... is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her
pregnancy.").
179. Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools, 487 U.S. 450, 457-458 (1988)
("Unless a statute provokes 'strict judicial scrutiny' because it interferes with a 'fundamen-
tal right'... it will ordinarily survive an equal protection attack so long as the challenged
classification is rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.").
180. Evangelium Vitae, supra note 137, at § 71.
181. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
851 (1992) ("At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence,
of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.").
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heart of the moral conscience."18 2 His word choice was no mere accident.
Rather, he was specifically addressing the legal acceptance of our culture
of death, which he viewed as "both a disturbing symptom and a signifi-
cant cause of grave moral decline."' 18
3
Although he adopted the language of the Supreme Court, he
refused to accede to their authority on these matters. He pointed out that
democracy, in and of itself, has no inherent moral value; rather, it obtains
its moral value by adherence to the moral law.'8 4 The Court, he implies,
has abandoned the moral law, by legitimizing practices-contraception
and abortion-that it lacks the authority to legitimize. "No circum-
stance, no purpose, no law whatsoever can ever make licit an act which is
intrinsically illicit, since it is contrary to the Law of God, which is writ-
ten in every human heart," he argued, thereby rejecting the holdings of
Griswold, Eisenstadt, Roe, Casey, and the like.' 8 5 Such holdings, he sug-
gested, are inherently lacking in any sort of judicial validity, and there is
no obligation to obey these laws.' 8 6 In fact, he argued just the opposite is
true: everyone has an obligation to oppose them.'8 7
John Paul was aware of the dramatic effect that abortion and contra-
ception were having on the Western world. He found the decline in the
birth rate "disturbing,"1 8' and hypothesized that TFRs were falling in
part because of the legal promotion of individual freedoms. The main
problem, as he saw it, is that crimes against life are viewed "as legitimate
expressions of individual freedom, to be acknowledged and protected as actual
rights."189 This, he argued, "is a self-centered concept of freedom"
because it "regards procreation as an obstacle to personal fulfillment."1 9'
Rather than seeing a child as a blessing to be cherished and nurtured for
the good of both the family and society, the child is instead seen as "an
enemy to be avoided at all costs," 1 91 who has the potential to "compro-
mise[ ] the well-being or life-style" of the parents.' 92 This result is the
unavoidable consequence of a society that values individualism above all
else. "[P]eople inevitably reach the point of rejecting one another," the
Pope warned. "Everyone else is considered an enemy from whom one has
182. Evangelium Vitae, supra note 137, at § 24.
183. I at § 4. Although this Note reflects primarily upon the decline of the
middle class from an economic standpoint, Pope John Paul II's reflection of a cultural
and moral decline merits exploration, as well.
184. Id. at § 70.
185. Id. at § 62.
186. Id at § 72-73.
187. Id. at § 73.
188. Id. at § 16 (emphasis in original).
189. Id at § 18.
190. Id. at § 13.
191. Id.
192. Id. at § 12.
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to defend oneself." 193 John Paul contends that this mentality forms the
foundation of the culture of death: the "war of the powerful against the
weak." 1
94
Rather than merely condemning the problem, John Paul offered a
solution: transform the culture. 195 The first step in this process "consists
of forming consciences with regard to the incomparable and inviolable
worth of every human life."1 96 The second step is a cultural adoption of
natural family planning as the sole method of regulating births, 197 a prac-
tice his predecessor, Paul VI, also recommended.1 98 John Paul empha-
sized that human beings are far more valuable than earthly riches, and
thus as a third step called for a rejection of the materialist worldview and
its accompanying desire for wealth. He encouraged all humanity to have
"the courage to adopt a new life-style, consisting in making practical
choices . . . on the basis of a correct scale of values: the primacy of being
over having, of the person over things."199
Finally, John Paul argued, simply repealing unjust laws, such as
those promulgated under Griswold and its progeny, would be insuffi-
cient. Rather, "[t]he underlying causes of attacks on life have to be elimi-
nated .... A family policy must be the basis and driving force of all social
policies."2 ° ° Because children are the greatest gift of marriage, govern-
ments should promote pronatalist policies that encourage child-bearing
by married couples. 2 1' A reform of the tax code would be a positive first
step in promoting pronatalism, but still more could be done. Even if the
lawmakers of this country cannot be convinced to overturn the Griswold-
inspired decisions-either by constitutional amendment or subsequent
Supreme Court decisions-individual Americans can still make the
affirmative choice of rejecting the contraceptive mentality. Those who
make this choice will assist in building a culture of life, a society dedi-
cated to continuing itself, and a nation committed to raising fertility
rates.
202
193. Id. at § 20.
194. Id. at § 12.
195. Id. at § 95.
196. Id. at § 96 (emphasis in original).
197. Id. at § 97.
198. Humanae Vitae, supra note 91, at § 16.
199. Evangelium Vitae, supra note 137, at § 98 (emphasis in original).
200. Id. at § 90 (emphasis in original).
201. Id. at § 92.
202. LONGMAN, supra note 6, at 33 ("So where will the children of the future
come from? They will come disproportionately from people who are at odds with the
modern environment - from people who don't "get" the new rules of the game that make
large families an economic and social liability, or who, out of fundamentalist or chauvin-
istic conviction, reject the game altogether.").
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C. Synthesis of the Solutions
This Note has advocated two distinct methods for raising the total
fertility rate above the replacement level. One option, which employs the
power of the government, would entail a pronatalist revision of the tax
code to provide financial incentives for raising three-child families. The
other option, which is more of a grassroots initiative, would consist of
individual citizens changing cultural norms through the way they live
their lives, collectively building a culture of life in which human beings
are valued and cherished above material goods and wealth. What should
be immediately apparent in comparing these two alternatives is that they
are intrinsically at odds with one another. The first option works within
the current cultural framework, relying on-in fact, promoting-a mate-
rialist worldview. This option presumes that the accumulation of mate-
rial wealth is a good, and offers couples the option of raising three-child
families without sacrificing any of the comforts and amenities of a mod-
ern middle-class lifestyle. The second option takes a fundamentally dif-
ferent approach, implicitly rejecting materialism as a basic premise.
Instead, this option calls for a transformation of culture, one in which
human beings are given primary importance and consideration, and are
fundamentally valued over material wealth.
Can these two options-one promoting and strengthening the
materialist worldview, and the other rejecting it-be adopted in tandem?
Should they? Yes, and yes. Both of these options are sorely needed and
could have a dramatic impact on the TFR, particularly among the mid-
dle class. Those members of the middle class who are comfortable with
the current cultural emphasis on material wealth would likely find a
pronatalist revision of the tax code to be a more persuasive reason for
having large families than the Catholic Church's interpretation of the
natural law. Furthermore, they might exhibit a greater willingness to have
three-child families if they know that they will not suffer overly burden-
some economic consequences in raising a third child. Those middle-class
citizens who embrace the authority of the Church, on the other hand,
might find the teaching of the papacy to be a more compelling rationale.
These people might be more inclined to alter their lives based on the
ecclesiastical solution, rather than the secular one.
In summary, these solutions should be adopted concurrently.
Although they differ in their underlying assumptions regarding the mate-
rialist worldview, both seek the same noble goal of raising the total fertil-
ity rate. Although each proposal, if adopted independently, would
probably have a noticeable effect on the TFR, the two implemented in
tandem would likely have a far greater impact on raising the fertility rate.
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VII. CONCLUSION
If our fertility rates continue to lag beneath the replacement level,
we will inevitably face population decline. Perhaps the greatest conse-
quences of such a decline will be the collective aging of our population,
the concomitant collapse of Social Security, and a faltering economy. If
we take action now, though, we can prevent these harmful results from
ever occurring. If the government promotes a pronatalist policy, it might
be able to convince enough people to have more children-children who
will in turn become the taxpayers of tomorrow, who will decrease the
average age of the population, who will help stabilize Social Security
funds, and who will assist in revitalizing our economy. One way to
achieve this aim is through a reform of the tax code in which all taxpayers
would be given incentives to raise three-child families. Another way to
achieve a boost in fertility rates-one that could be done in the absence
of Congressional or judicial action-is through adherence to the teach-
ings of the Catholic Church, the authoritative interpreter of the natural
law, which consistently promotes procreation, denounces the contracep-
tive mentality, and rejects the authority of governments to sanction or
promote activities which result in the prevention or destruction of
human life. Both of these options for raising fertility rates would likely
have a noticeable effect if implemented individually, but they would have
a far more substantial impact on the TFR if adopted concurrently.
As Pope John Paul II proclaimed in Evangelium Vitae, "Life is
always a good."2 ° 3 Let us then protect this good-lawmakers and ordi-
nary citizens alike-by promoting pronatalism and collectively building a
culture of life. In so doing, we just might see our fertility rates rise, and
avoid the oncoming dangers of population decline.
203. Evangelium Vitae, supra note 137, at § 34.
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